d.1
Geir Hilmar Haarde Prime Minister (15 June 2006 – 1 February 2009)
The witness list:
d.2
Björgvin G. Sigurðsson, Ex Minister of Business Affairs
Arnór Sighvatsson, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank
Davíð Oddsson, Ex Governor of the Central Bank
d.3
Ingimundur Friðriksson, Ex Governor of the Central Bank
Baldur Guðlaugsson, Ex Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Finance*
Bolli Þór Bollason, Ex Permanent Secretary, Prime Minister’s Office
Áslaug Árnadóttir, Ex Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Business Affairs
Jón Sigurðsson, Ex Board of Directors, Financial Supervisory Authority (FME)
Jón Þ. Sigurgeirsson, Director of International Department, Central Bank
d.4
Jón Þór Sturluson, Ex Assistant to the Minister of Business Affairs
Jónas Fr. Jónsson, Ex CEO of the Financial Supervisory Authority (FME)
Hreiðar Már Sigurðsson, Ex CEO of Kaupthing Bank
Guðjón Rúnarsson, Managing Director Icelandic Financial Services Association
Rúnar Guðmundsson, Head of Insurance Market FME
Þorsteinn Már Baldvinsson, Ex Chairman of the Board of Glitnir Bank
Jónína S. Lárusdóttir, Ex Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Business Affairs
d.5
Sigurdur Sturla Pálsson, Director of the International and Market Operations Department of the Central Bank
Tryggvi Þór Herbertsson, Ex Economic Advisor to the Prime Minister (and coauthor with Mishkin)
Sigurdur Sturla Pálsson, Director of the International and Market Operations Department of the Central Bank
Tryggvi Þór Herbertsson Ex Economic Advisor to the Prime Minister (and coauthor with Mishkin)
Vilhelm Már Þorsteinsson, Ex Head of Corporate Banking Glitnir Bank
Heimir Haraldsson, Resolution Committee of Glitnir Bank
Jóhannes Rúnar Jóhannsson, Resolution Committee of Kaupþing Bank.
Jón Guðni Ómarsson, Ex Chief Financial Officer Glitnir Bank
Kristján Óskarsson, Resolution Committee of Glitnir Bank
Lárentsínus Kristjánsson, Resolution Committee of Landsbanki Bank
Vignir Rafn Gíslason, Certified Accountant Price Waterhouse Coopers
Kristján Andri Stefánsson, Ex head of department, Prime Minister’s Office
Sylvía Kristín Ólafsdóttir, Ex head of contingency planning, Central Bank
Ossur Skarphedinsson, Ex Minister of Industry
Johanna Sigurdardottir, Ex Minister of Social Affairs
d.6
Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir, Ex Minister of Foreign Affairs
Sigurður Einarsson, Ex Chairman of the board, Kaupthing Bank
Lárus Welding, Ex CEO Glitnir Bank
Stefán Svavarsson, Chief accountant Central Bank (CBI) and member of the board, Financial Supervisory Authority (FME)
Halldór J. Kristánsson, Ex CEO Landsbanki Bank
Sigurjón Þ. Árnason, Ex CEO Landsbanki Bank
Björgólfur Guðmundsson,. Ex chairman of the board, Landsbanki Bank
d.7
Tryggvi Palsson, Ex head of financial stability, Central Bank (CBI)
Jon Thorsteinn Oddleifsson, Ex head of treasury, Landsbanki Bank
Steingrimur Sigfusson, member of Althing
Arni M Mathiesen, Ex Minister of Finance
Geir Hilmar Haarde Ex Prime Minister
–
The Special Investigation Commission members and the related Parliamentary Committee members were struck from the witness list at a days notice?
* The Ex Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Finance has now started his 2 year jail sentence for insider trading and misconduct in public office.
It will be interesting to see if the court comes to the same conclution as did The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in the US — that this crisis was avoidable — the result of human actions, inactions, and misjudgments. Warnings were ignored. “The greatest tragedy would be to accept the refrain that no one could have seen this coming and thus nothing could have been done. If we accept this notion, it will happen again.”
d.1, a pitiful picture is emerging of a Commanding Officer lacking in leadership, initiative, command, and imagination. As an Office Manager he is fine, – as a Commander he is everything but.
d.2, state officials are in unison that they lost control to a Hydra-Headed Monster no human could be expected to contest. Not that they didn’t try.
d.3, nothing could be done after 2005 – 3 whole years of did not, could not. Learned helplessness is a technical term which comes to mind.
(From the Blogosphere – Whats similar between the National Theater and the Culture House? Sure – They’ve both been showing Les Misérables)
d.4, entirely absent in this amiable family gathering are penetrating questions, such as what happened to the entire foreign-exchange reserve in the minutes before the crash?
d.5, silent lambs, pack of wolves, and the Court clerk a sleep.
d.6, did everything right, nothing wrong. Conflicting testimony? Guardians of special-, banking-, and/or public interest? – Take your pick.
d.7, the grand finale, – shit happens – multiplied by 140 Northern Rock’s. In the Culture House the twin masks of the National Theater were replaced by The Mask of Sanity.
d.8, State prosecutor: Numerous warning signs and a mounting threat to the state, but did everything at the precedence of the banks.
d.9, Defense: All points in the prosecution evidence are deficient. The responsibility was with the Central bank.
What causes suspension of judgment on a mass scale? Religious myths? Economic cults?
It is unproven, that the priesthood of this particular sect did anything but appease their god. Most of them are still true believers. They have not found that their view of the world, their beloved ideology, was not right. That it was and is not working. Now they are eager to repeat it – only better, truer – convinced of a better outcome.
In their weakness our best and the brightest committed an heinous crime, they reminded us of who, what, and how we are, of our own perpetual escape from freedom.
I did not know, I could not do, it’s their fault
????This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly
ICB’s Recommendations